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Long	read:	how	to	deploy	the	emergency	brake	to
manage	migration
Freedom	of	movement	is	one	of	the	‘red	lines’	that	preclude	Britain’s	continuing
membership	of	the	Single	Market:	the	PM	believes	the	referendum	was	a	clear
rejection	of	the	principle.	But	could	the	UK	deploy	an	’emergency	brake’	at
regional	(rather	than	national)	level	to	help	manage	EU	migration	and
thereby	qualify	for	European	Economic	Area	membership?	Catherine	Barnard
and	Sarah	Fraser	Butlin	(University	of	Cambridge)	look	at	how	it	might	be
possible	to	allay	Leavers’	fears.
In	two	previous	blogs	(here	and	here)	in	this	series	we	began	to	outline	our	notion	of	‘fair	movement’.	In	the	first	we
argued	for	a	clear	linkage	between	the	ability	to	migrate	into	the	UK	and	undertaking	an	economic	activity.		In	the
second	we	argued	that	current	restrictions	on	the	principle	of	equal	treatment	should	be	utilised,	particularly
residence	requirements,	before	allowing	access	to	social	security	benefits.		This	final	post	focuses	on	the	third
element	of	the	proposed	scheme:	the	emergency	brake	provisions.	We	argue	that	combining	our	approach	to	equal
treatment	with	an	emergency	brake	would	achieve	a	managed	but	flexible	approach	to	migration.
This	approach	reflects	both	the	origins	of	free	movement	and	other	existing	agreements,	including	with	EEA	states.
Such	an	approach	based	on	fair	movement	may,	therefore,	be	acceptable	to	the	EU	in	a	future	trade	agreement
while	at	the	same	time	go	some	way	to	meeting	the	concerns	of	UK	voters.	As	with	the	previous	two	blogs,	we	locate
our	arguments	in	the	context	of	the	original	discussions	about	the	shape	of	free	movement	rules	to	show	continuity
between	what	we	propose	and	what	the	EU	has	considered	in	the	past.
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Origins	of	free	movement
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Although	the	question	of	an	emergency	brake	was	a	difficult	issue	during	the	discussions	establishing	the	Common
Market,	the	need	to	restrict	free	movement	in	certain	circumstances	was	a	consistent	theme.		Thus,	a	note	by	the
Inter-Governmental	Committee	(IGC)	in	November	1955	recognised	the	need	for	certain	safeguarding	clauses	in
case	of	an	influx	of	a	workforce	that	would	cause	a	particular	risk	to	certain	industries	in	a	particular	country.		This
reflected	the	concerns	of	several	delegations:	the	French	delegation	was	worried	that	migration	should	be	limited
according	to	the	capacity	of	the	member	state	to	absorb	migrant	workers;	Luxembourg	was	concerned	about	its
ability	to	implement	free	movement	of	workers,	given	its	social	and	demographic	structure;	and	Belgium	had
concerns	about	the	burden	created	by	possible	large	scale	migration.
The	Spaak	report	of	21	April	1956,	which	provided	the	foundations	for	the	negotiations	establishing	the	Common
Market,	supported	earlier	proposals	for	the	gradual	introduction	of	free	movement	by	way	of	a	1%	increase	in	migrant
worker	numbers	each	year.	However,	the	report	also	noted	the	reluctance	of	workers	to	move,	even	within	one
country	and	this	indicated	that	some	sort	of	controlled	migration	might	not	in	fact	be	necessary.		Ultimately,	it	seems
that	this	latter	view	won	the	day:	the	final	version	of	Article	48	EEC	on	free	movement	of	workers	(now	Article	45
TFEU)	included	no	reference	to	quotas,	nor	to	a	gradual	introduction	of	free	movement	nor	an	emergency	brake.
Nevertheless,	the	history	of	the	provision	shows	that	the	possible	need	for	an	emergency	brake	of	some	sort	was	a
concern	for	many	of	the	delegations,	albeit	that	so	little	migration	occurred	between	1957-2004	that	any	further
discussion	of	an	emergency	brake	on	migration	proved	unnecessary.	The	world	has	since	changed.	While	continued
free	movement	would	be	what	the	EU	would	like,	political	realities	indicate	change	is	needed.	So	we	ask:	Is	there	a
way	of	facilitating	free	movement	while	meeting	the	political	need	to	take	back	some	control	of	migration?	We	argue
there	is	and	existing	agreements	provide	the	way.
Existing	agreements
Some	people	have	suggested	that	an	emergency	brake	of	some	sort	can	be	read	into	the	express	derogations	of	the
Treaty.	However,	we	focus	on	four	other	agreements	which,	we	argue	provide	a	more	secure	template	for	an
emergency	brake	provision.
Firstly,	Article	112	of	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	Treaty	contains	a	broad	safeguard	clause:
If	serious	economic,	societal	or	environmental	difficulties	of	a	sectoral	or	regional	nature	liable	to	persist
are	arising,	a	Contracting	Party	may	unilaterally	take	appropriate	measures	under	the	conditions	and
procedures	laid	down	in	Article	113.
Article	112(2)	adds	that	‘Such	safeguard	measures	shall	be	restricted	with	regard	to	their	scope	and	duration	to	what
is	strictly	necessary	in	order	to	remedy	the	situation.	Priority	shall	be	given	to	such	measures	as	will	least	disturb	the
functioning	of	this	Agreement.’	Article	113	EEA	prescribes	the	procedure	for	triggering	the	procedure,	involving	the
notification	of	Contracting	Parties	and	consultation	with	the	EEA	Joint	Committee.		When	exceptional	circumstances
requiring	immediate	action	exclude	prior	examination,	protective	measures	may	be	applied.		Safeguard	measures
that	are	taken	must	be	reviewed	every	three	months	with	a	view	to	their	abolition	or	to	the	limitation	of	their	scope	of
application.	A	safeguard	clause	of	this	kind	has	been	borrowed	for	the	purposes	of	the	Northern	Ireland/Ireland
Protocol	in	the	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement.
Secondly,	the	EEA	agreement	did	contain	one	specific	limitation	on	free	movement	of	people	for	the	tiny	state	of
Liechtenstein.	Before	Liechtenstein	joined	the	EEA,	the	EEA	Council	recognised	that	it	was	vulnerable	to	excessive
migration	due	to	its	very	small	inhabitable	area.		Upon	joining	the	EEA,	temporary	measures	were	put	in	place
allowing	Liechtenstein	to	impose	‘quantitative	limitations’	on	immigration	until	1	January	1998.	Towards	the	end	of
the	transitional	period,	no	permanent	solution	had	been	found	and	Liechtenstein	unilaterally	invoked	Article	112
EEA.		On	17	December	1999	it	was	decided	that	the	‘specific	geographical	situation’	of	Liechtenstein	still	justified	the
maintenance	of	certain	conditions	on	the	right	to	taking	up	residence.	Text	was	added	to	the	EEA	Agreement,
providing	that	EEA	citizens	may	take	up	residence	in	Liechtenstein	but	were	required	to	have	a	residence	permit	if
they	were	remaining	for	more	than	3	months	of	the	year	or	to	take	up	employment	or	other	permanent	economic
activity.	A	permit	was	not	required	for	those	providing	cross-border	services.	A	quota	for	residence	permits	was
applied	although	no	permit	is	required	to	be	able	to	work	in	Liechtenstein,	only	to	reside	there.	These	arrangements
are	reviewed	every	five	years.
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Thirdly,	Switzerland	has	introduced	a	new	provision	giving	priority	for	local	hires	following	the	Swiss	referendum	in
February	2014.	The	Swiss	electorate	had	voted	to	amend	the	Swiss	Constitution	to	limit	immigration	through	quotas
and	restrict	the	rights	of	foreign	nationals	to	permanent	residence,	family	reunification	and	access	to	social	benefits.
This	was	incompatible	with	the	bilateral	EU	Agreement	on	Free	Movement	of	Persons	within	the	EU	and	the	EU
reacted	by	suspending	Switzerland’s	participation	in	the	EU	research	and	student	programmes,	Horizon	2020	and
Erasmus+.
Lengthy	negotiations	followed	and	eventually	on	16	December	2016	a	new	law	was	adopted,	coming	into	force	in	the
summer	of	2018,	giving	priority	to	Swiss-based	job	seekers,	that	is,	both	Swiss	and	foreign	nationals	registered	with
Swiss	job	agencies,	in	sectors	or	regions	where	the	unemployment	rates	are	higher	than	average.	‘Higher	than
average’	unemployment	has	been	defined	as	the	12	month	average	unemployment	rate	plus	5	percentage
points.		During	the	transitional	period,	this	will	rise	to	being	the	12	month	average	unemployment	rate	plus	8%.		In
those	sectors	or	regions,	an	employer	must	advertise	any	role	with	the	central	employment	agency	for	five	working
days.	Only	after	that	period,	may	the	job	be	advertised	through	all	the	usual	channels	and	the	employer	may	recruit
from	abroad.		An	employer	will	be	fined	for	non-compliance.
Fourthly,	the	text	of	the	(now	defunct)	New	Settlement	Agreement,	negotiated	by	David	Cameron	with	the	EU	in
February	2016,	contained	not	only	provision	for	an	emergency	brake	on	benefits	but	also	a	potentially	significant
provision	of	a	putative	emergency	brake	on	the	volume	of	migration:
Whereas	the	free	movement	of	workers	under	Article	45	TFEU	entails	the	abolition	of	any	discrimination
based	on	nationality	as	regards	employment,	remuneration	and	other	conditions	of	work	and	employment,
this	right	may	be	subject	to	limitations	on	grounds	of	public	policy,	public	security	or	public	health.	In
addition,	if	overriding	reasons	of	public	interest	make	it	necessary,	free	movement	of	workers	may	be
restricted	by	measures	proportionate	to	the	legitimate	aim	pursued.	Encouraging	recruitment,	reducing
unemployment,	protecting	vulnerable	workers	and	averting	the	risk	of	seriously	undermining	the
sustainability	of	social	security	systems	are	reasons	of	public	interest	recognised	in	the	jurisprudence	of
the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	for	this	purpose,	based	on	a	case	by	case	analysis.
So	where	is	the	emergency	brake?	It	is	buried	in	the	language.	According	to	the	orthodoxy,	direct	discrimination	can
only	be	saved	by	express	derogations,	indirect	discrimination	can	be	saved	by	a	broader	range	of	objective
justifications.	The	striking	feature	of	the	Brussels	text	is	that	it	does	not	restrict	objective	justifications	(or	‘overriding
reasons	of	public	interest’	as	they	are	referred	to)	to	indirectly	discriminatory	measures.	This	might	suggest	that	even
directly	discriminatory	measures	could	be	justified	on	the	grounds	of	‘encouraging	recruitment’	and	‘reducing
unemployment’.	This	might	suggest	that	there	was	scope	to	read	into	the	New	Settlement	Agreement	a	means	of
developing	the	EU’s	own	emergency	brake	on	the	volume	of	migration.
We	therefore	argue	that	there	are	models	for	what	might	become	the	UK’s	emergency	brake.	How	might	they	be
applied	in	the	context	of	a	model	based	on	fair	movement?
The	future?
We	would	call	for	the	introduction	of	an	emergency	brake,	not	at	national	level	but	at	regional	level,	perhaps	at	the
level	of	devolved	administrations	or	other	regional	groupings,	to	take	account	of	the	substantial	variation	in	the	needs
of	the	regions.	At	present	Scotland	is	calling	for	more	migration,	parts	of	England	less	so.	Thus,	an	emergency	brake
mechanism	would	need	to	apply	on	a	regional	basis.	Relying	on	both	economic	data	(such	as	labour	market	criteria
e.g.	relative	levels	of	unemployment,	demands	for	unemployment	benefits,	wage	levels),	demand	for	public	services
(e.g.	population	growth,	population	churn,	waiting	lists)	and	political	experience	(e.g.	what	constituents	are	saying
through	the	ballot	box	and	in	person	at	surgeries),	these	regions	could	make	a	request	to	national	government	to
impose	restrictions	on	migration	for	a	time	limited	period.	These	restrictions	might	be	sectoral,	based	on	skill	levels,
or	more	general	and	for	a	defined	period	of	time.		The	operation	of	the	registration	system	outlined	in	blog	1	would	be
the	vehicle	for	controlling	those	who	could	work	in	a	particular	area.
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Who	might	pull	the	emergency	brake?		There	is	clearly	a	need	for	both	an	objective	evidence	base	for	its	application
such	as	economic	data.	However,	given	the	highly	politicised	nature	of	the	issue,	the	decision	of	when	to	pull	the
emergency	brake	could	not	simply	be	left	to	a	body	separate	to	the	Government.	Nevertheless,	we	would	suggest
that	there	would	also	need	to	be	certain	safeguard	provisions	in	place	requiring	minimum	objective	indicators	in	the
economic	data	to	be	met	before	any	subjective	political	decision	might	be	made.	The	EU	is	unlikely	to	concede	on
any	such	mechanism	without	a	dual	control	by	the	EU.	So	a	mechanism	like	the	one	in	Article	113	EEA	would	also
need	to	be	established.
Would	such	mechanisms	satisfy	Leave	voters	or	would	they	regard	them	as	merely	window	dressing?	Much	depends
on	the	seriousness	with	which	the	mechanism	is	regarded,	the	rigorousness	of	the	objective	criteria	and	the
willingness	of	local	politicians	to	engage.
Conclusions
For	purists,	what	we	are	proposing	does	serious	damage	to	the	principles	of	free	movement	of	persons.		We	know
that.	However,	we	recognise	that,	following	Brexit,	the	UK	will	no	longer	be	in	the	EU’s	paradigm	of	free	movement.
While	universities	and	other	big	employers	have	benefitted	from	free	movement,	we	recognise	that	politically	free
movement	is	unlikely	to	be	the	outcome	of	the	negotiations	(except	possibly	for	a	short	transitional	period).		The
economic	benefits	of	migration	are	not	in	doubt	but	we	recognise	that	the	political	will	for	continued	free	movement	is
simply	not	there.
In	our	scheme,	we	seek	to	square	that	circle	and	offer	some,	admittedly	crude,	options	for	a	way	forward.		What	we
propose	is	a	scheme	which	demonstrates	to	the	British	public	that	the	government	is	taking	back	control	of	migration
while	at	the	same	time	offering	flexibility	for	those	employers,	including	farmers	and	those	in	the	hospitality	sector,
who	argue	they	need	access	to	EEA	workers	but	without	facing	the	bureaucracy	and	costs	associated	with	a	full
blooded	visa	regime.
Some	might	argue	that	our	proposed	scheme,	discussed	across	the	three	blogs,	is	not	so	different	from	the	current
free	movement	rules	as	applied	in	the	UK.	We	disagree.	First,	our	proposal	for	fair	movement	introduces	a
registration	scheme	and	requires	those	registering	generally	to	be	engaged	in	economic	activity.	Second,	we	have
argued	that	economic	activity	must	be	accompanied	by	a	meaningful	salary	threshold	or	have	a	relatively	high	skill
level.	Third,	our	scheme	would	allow	restrictions	on	access	to	social	security	benefits.	Fourth,	we	argue	that	there
should	be	an	emergency	brake	which	is	not	currently	available	under	EU	law.
We	recognise	that	a	scheme	which	is	neither	free	movement	nor	highly	restrictive	access	risk	pleasing	no-one	but	at
the	moment	there	is	little	else	on	the	table.	We	also	recognise	that	concerns	about	migration	are	many	and	varied
and	that	they	interconnect	with	concerns	about	other	policy	choices:	cutbacks	in	public	services,	the	failure	of	the
planning	system	to	deliver	sufficient	and	affordable	housing	to	meet	local	needs,	and	the	failure	of	the	enforcement
agencies	(where	they	exist)	to	ensure	that	EU	workers’	employment	rights	are	enforced.
The	system	we	propose	would	show	that	the	UK	is	responding	to	the	basic	calls	to	take	back	control	of	immigration,
while	giving	the	government	time	to	tackle	the	deeper	seated,	more	intractable	problems	concerning	lack	of	skills	and
training	in	the	UK	and	the	need	to	provide	proper	funding	for	public	services.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	not	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at	EU
Law	Analysis.
Catherine	Barnard	is	Professor	of	European	Union	Law	at	the	University	of	Cambridge.
Sarah	Fraser	Butlin	is	an	affiliated	lecturer	at	the	Faculty	of	Law,	University	of	Cambridge	and	a	practising	barrister	at
Cloisters	Chambers,	London.
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